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The rise of China has become one of the contemporary mainstays of geopolitical debate, with implications for the
United States, Europe, Africa and perhaps most of all the rest of Asia. But what of its impact for democracy? Does
the existence of an economically successful non-democratic player mean that other countries are seeking to
replicate their model? Julie Bader argues that for now at least, that is not the case. 
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China has emerged as one of the most important international actors of our times. It is now the world’s largest
trading nation, the second largest oil consumer after the United States, and it has become a non-negligible source
of aid and foreign investment. Some fear that amongst the many implications this may have for the rest of the world,
the rise of China will make the world less democratic.
Unlike the European Union’s and the United States’ explicit agenda of regime change and democracy promotion,
few authoritarian regimes would normatively subscribe to the promotion of authoritarianism elsewhere.
Nevertheless, examples abound of autocratsgiving each other a helping hand. But China’s role is ambiguous: On
the one hand, China’s patronage of the most awkward dictatorships of our time comes to mind, North Korea and
Myanmar until 2011; on the other,the Chinese Communist Party rejects any interventionist ambitions and frequently
refers to the principle of noninterference.
China’s leader fear democratic upheavals inside of China and along its borders
China is a vital source of energy and the biggest trading partner for the internationally isolated regime in North
Korea, and in 2007 it casted its first non-Taiwan related veto in the UN Security Council since 1973 to stop a
resolution against human rights violations in Myanmar. But for all the support and protection these regimes have
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received, the Chinese government is worrying as much about their domestic mismanagement as about any “rough”
behavior towards the international community. Both could provoke external intervention which would, from the
Chinese perspective, amount to an American “encirclement”. Therefore, the Chinese protection of these regimes
against pressure from outside is better understood as a matter of security rather than specific love for the generals
and in both cases it was paired with the hope to stimulate reforms so as to increase their responsiveness to
domestic grievances.
Whether with American involvement or not, democratic uprisings are worrisome for Chinese leaders as they could
spill over and inspire similar anti-government protests at home. For example, the color revolutions in the former
Soviet republics in the early 2000s triggered the Chinese to restrict NGOs operating in China and led to the
bolstering of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation to a bulwark against anti-regime activity in Central Asia. Even
the much more distant Arab Spring in Northern Africa provoked fears of a domino effect in China, so Chinese
security forces preventively cracked down on domestic democracy activists.
Non-interference legitimizes and reinforces non-democratic practices  
Yet beyond shielding itself from pressure to democratise, China’s leadership appears to have little interest in a
specific form of governance elsewhere and even principally opposes meddling in the internal affairs of others. The
principle of noninterference, a long-standing guideline in China’s foreign policy , puts a premium on state sovereignty
and rejects any kind of unconsented external intervention into another state’s domestic affairs.
Simply speaking, the noninterference principle prescribes turning a blind eye to a state’s domestic affairs and
engaging any government – regardless of regime type or conduct. At times noninterference directly legitimized, if not
enhanced, repressive and anti-democratic behavior. For instance, when Chinese leaders welcomed with a 21-gun
salute Uzbekistan’s president Karminov just after the Andijan massacre in 2005 or when just after the disputed 2008
elections a container ship full of arms was  sent to Zimbabwe tacitly approving that President Mugabe would use
these weapons to silence domestic protest.
More generally, the principle justifies China’s rejection of aid conditionality on good-governance which OECD donors
find increasingly important. And it motivates China’s objections against international sanctions as a matter of
principle. While China using its veto power in the UN Security Council as in the case of Myanmar is rather
exceptional, China was often successful in watering-down UN resolutions or preventing them from being tabled in
the first place. In some cases, this has encouraged internationally isolated regimes, such as in Iran, to seek
protection against international intervention by seeking Chinese investments and so binding Chinese interest to the
regime.
The crux with noninterference is that while claiming not to affect the domestic context elsewhere, it is likely to result
in just that. This is because domestic politics and foreign affairs are intimately linked. Governments as well as their
opponents frequently use interaction with the outside world to appeal to domestic constituencies, for example when
they claim credit for foreign investment or aid. Noninterference per definition implies to focus all interaction on the
incumbent government which represents a sovereign state. But only with a level playingfield at home, such selective
engagement by the Chinese does not disproportionately advantage incumbents such as Mugabe or Karminov over
their competitors.
Trade relations with China prolong authoritarian rule, but on the whole, China’s influence is overstated
Because China’s noninterference policy is so clearly skewed towards incumbents, we should be able to observe this
at the level of individual governments if China’s rise indeed leads to more authoritarianism in the world. In a recent
article, I investigated how several forms of bilateral interaction with China – state visits, trade dependence, arms
trade, and two proxies for Chinese development cooperation and investments –may strengthen an incumbent
leader’s position in power.
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My results are mixed. On the one hand, intense trade relations with China significantly prolong authoritarian rule in
China’s trade partners. Authoritarian leaders and regimes remain longer in power when China is an important export
destination, i.e. exports to China as share of total exports are relatively high. Interestingly, this effect cannot simply
be attributed to oil-producing countries. Neither is it exclusively driven by African countries some of which are highly
export-dependent on China.
On the other hand, however, my analysis suggests that China’s influence is rather overstated, at least for the period
directly after the end of the Cold War until the end of 2008, which I investigated. Neither bilateral high-level
diplomatic visits, nor the transfer of arms, nor any other forms of bilateral interaction with China significantly bolster
the power of authoritarian leaders or regimes. This is not to dismiss the possibility that interaction with China has
been vital for individual governments, but in statistical terms we cannot observe that it systematically advantages
and prolongs the tenure of incumbents.
Leaders in democracies do not profit from interaction with China either: none of the different types of interactions
with China is associated with prolonged power for democratic leaders. This latter finding intuitively makes sense,
because institutional constraints tend to be strong in democracies. Leaders in democracies are restricted in how
they use resources and re-invest external assistance domestically and they are often limited in their terms in office.
China is discovering the limits of noninterference, the West should stop demonizing the rise of China
So, despite China’s questionable engagement with some of the world’s worst despots, accounts that attribute
authoritarian persistence in the world to the rise of China seem to be overblown. Meanwhile, China’s foreign policy-
makers are going through an intense learning phase as the Darfur crisis as well as anti-Chinese backlashes in
various African and Asian countries exposed the limits of a strict noninterference policy. Most importantly, perhaps,
Chinese leaders now recognize that even if mismanagement and domestic conflict elsewhere can be ignored in the
short run, it is likely to threaten returns to economic investments in the long-term.
While China is incrementally stretching the interpretation of noninterference, Western media should stop demonising
the rise of China. The world is too complex to draw a black-and-white good-democracies versus bad-autocracies
picture. Looking closely enough beyond well-intended democracy promotion, one can find many instances in which
Western democracies’ foreign relations, including those with non-democracies, do not look so much different from
those of China.  
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